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I INTRODUCTION 
The Right to Silence ('Right') is a fundamental individual right, that is applied to both the 
common law and civil law legal traditions.  This paper will focus on the criminal law 
provisions, whereby the Right is underpinned by the common law and statutory principles of 
the presumption of innocence, the right to not have to testify at trial, the privilege against 
self-incrimination ('Privilege') and the right to a fair trial.  These principles form an integral 
part of our criminal justice system, protecting the accused from compulsory or overbearing 
state interrogations, the burden of proof, not having to testify against oneself and the right to 
be treated fairly, equally and without prejudice.1 
Unlike Canada and the United States of America ('USA'), the Right in Australia is not 
constitutionally protected 2 and there are no foreseeable endeavours to achieve that; it is not 
an absolute guarantee.  Despite its lack of constitutional status, the Right has been statutorily 
protected in two States, within the presumption of innocence principles.3 To date, these 
statutes have not been judicially interpreted within the criminal law context, therefore, the 
application and extent of protection remains unclear.  In recent years, the Right was protected 
under the uniform evidence legislation, comprising the Commonwealth’s Uniform Evidence 
Act 1995 ('UEA') and the New South Wales Evidence Act 1995 ('NSW Act') in 1995 
(mirroring the UEA).  The majority of the remaining states and the Northern Territory ('NT') 
progressively followed with identical model legislation, except Victoria, where jurisdictional 
amendments were incorporated.4   
Sections 17, 20, 89 and 128 of the NSW Act protect the defendant against prejudicial judicial 
comment and adverse inferences drawn from the defendant’s silence, when failing to answer 
questions or produce documents.  However, in 2013, NSW acted against the COAG5 uniform 
evidence agreement, by implementing reforms to the NSW Act ('NSW Amendments'), 
primarily enabling a jury to draw an unfavourable inference from the defendant’s silence, in 
serious indictable offences.  These reforms were not supported by the legal fraternity, the 
1    Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s126G, 'Criminal proceeding has the same meaning as criminal proceedings has in   
Division 2 of Part 5 of Chapter 6 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986'. 
2    X7 v Australian Crime Commission (2013) 298 ALR 570, [105] (Hayne and Bell JJ). 
3    Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic), s 25; Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT), s 22. 
4    See, eg, Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 [NT], Evidence Act 2008 [Vic]. 
5    Council of Australian Governments. 
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NSW Police Association, the New South Wales Law Reform Commission ('NSWLRC') or 
the Law Society.   However, the justification for the reforms was, allegedly, to close a 
loophole, preventing hardened criminals from hiding behind the Right to avoid conviction.  
These reforms were implemented in an environment where the High Court of Australia 
('HCA') found an adverse inference,drawn by a jury when the Right is exercised, to be an 
erosion of the Right, 'render[ing] it valueless'.6   
This paper will argue the NSW Amendments have eroded the contemporary Right in all 
criminal proceedings, using similar United Kingdom ('UK') reforms as a contrast.  Against 
international and Commonwealth of Australia's ('Commonwealth') perspectives, the paper 
will also demonstrate how the indeterminate nature of the Right, together with the absence of 
constitutional backing, enhances its vulnerability, against a threat of statutory abrogation and 
emerging international influences.   To validate these assertions, the paper will explore the 
deleterious impacts of  the NSW Amendments on the Right, particularly on the unfavourable 
inferences now drawn by a jury at trial, the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof 
and the right not to have to testify or confess guilt.  Finally, the paper will consider the 
wisdom of implementing the NSW Amendments and the potential impact on the 
harmonisation of evidence laws in Australia.     
However, before these explorations are undertaken, it is important to comprehend the scope 
of the Right, its historical origins and its evolution in the 20th Century.   
II ORIGINS 
The Right was inherited in Australia from the English common law system of justice.  As an 
acknowledgement of the Privilege, it relates to criminal responsibility and is alleged to have 
been well founded by the second half of the 17th Century.7  It arose from the common law 
maxim nemo tenetur prodere seipsum, meaning defendants are not compelled to betray 
themselves.8  Arguably, the Privilege emanated in the Star Chamber of King Henry VIII 
during the 17th Century, to address the power imbalance between the prosecution and the 
accused, whereby the accused was unprotected from self-incrimination, resulting in 
6    Petty v The Queen (1991) 173 CLR 95, 99 (Mason CJ, Deane, Toohey and McHugh JJ). 
7    X7 v Australian Crime Commission (2013) 298 ALR 570, [44] (French CJ and Brennan J). 
8    Peter Butt (ed), Concise Australian Legal Dictionary (LexisNexis Butterworths, 3rd ed, 2004) 295.   
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involuntary and false confessions.9  Much debate ensued, over many decades, between 
academics and historians regarding the accuracy of these origins.  In contemporary Australia,  
the HCA opined in Azzopardi v The Queen10 ('Azzopardi') 'the maxim did not make the 
privilege'.11    However, this debate is beyond the scope of this paper and the author relies on 
the popular origins regaled by influential jurist, Sir William Blackstone,  who confirmed the 
maxim was enlivened where the accused’s 'fault was not to be wrung out of himself, but 
rather to be discovered by other means and other men'.12  The extensive misuse of power 
under the British inquisitorial system enlivened the principle of voluntary confessions, 
thereby preventing the accused from acting as a witness for the prosecution, which 
established the Right.  Later, mandatory cautions emerged in 1848,13 when investigative 
powers were vested in the police, which firmly established the common law Right.14  This 
legal procedure survived the transformation to the existing accusatorial system of justice 
under English law,15 which Australia inherited. 
Traditionally, in NSW, an accused could only make an unsworn statement and could not 
testify.  This position dramatically changed in 1891, when the defendant was granted the right 
to give evidence.  It was closely followed by the ability to draw adverse inferences from the 
defendant's silence in 1893.   However, in 1898, direct comment on the defendant's silence 
was again prohibited.16  Subsequently, the NSW Crimes Act 1900 prohibited comment from 
the judge or counsel on the failure of the accused to give evidence and adverse inferences 
could not be drawn by the jury from silence exercised during trial and pre-trial proceedings.17   
Fast forward to the 20th Century, the precarious nature of the Right provoked Lord Mustill 
into clarifying it as 'a disparate  group of immunities',18 that are capable of being encroached 
by statute.19  Primarily, Lord Mustill described the immunities as applicable to all persons, 
releasing them from a compulsion, upon pain or punishment, to answer questions from other 
9   Australian Law Reform Commission, Traditional Rights and Freedoms - Encroachments by Commonwealth 
Laws, Issues Paper 46 (2014) 74 [10.12].  
10   Azzopardi v The Queen [2001] HCA 25, 124. 
11   Ibid, quoting Langbein, 'The Privilege and Common Law Criminal Procedure: The Sixteenth to the 
Eighteenth Centuries, in Helmholz et al, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Its Origins and 
Development (1997) 82, 107. 
12   Rees v Kratzmann (1965) 114 CLR 63, 80 (Windeyer J) citing William Blackstone, Commentaries on the 
Laws of England, 1765 vol IV, 293. 
13   Smith v Director of Serious Fraud Office [1992] 3 WLR 66, 31 [G]. 
14   New South Wales Law Reform Commission, The Right to Silence, Report 95 (July 2000) 11. 
15   Hammond v Commonwealth of Australia (1982) 152 C.L.R. 188, 10 (Murphy J). 
16   Azzopardi v The Queen [2001] HCA 25, 52. 
17    NSW Crimes Act 1900 s407(2), since repealed. 
18    Smith v Director of Serious Fraud Office [1992] 3 WLR 66, 30 [F]. 
19    Ibid. 
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persons, including police officers and those in authority, and that adverse inferences could 
not be drawn from such silence at trial.20  Australia subsequently adopted this 'bundle of 
rights' interpretation of the Right.21  
III RIGHT OR PRIVILEGE 
Although the Right and the Privilege are often used interchangeably, they are quite 
distinctive, with divergent limitations that apply during pre-trial and trial proceedings.22 
The Privilege operates as an immunity from answering questions or producing documents, 
when the use of such information may incriminate a person being questioned.23  Importantly, 
the mere belief of such incrimination is not, of itself, sufficient to exclude the evidence from 
use.  The court must decide, based on the circumstances, the evidence to be adduced and its 
purpose, whether a real danger of incrimination or conviction exists.24   
The Right encompasses the Privilege and operates from the time the suspect is charged and 
cautioned, through to trial proceedings.  The HCA established the Right as an important 
element underlying the fundamental principle that the accused never has to prove his 
innocence.25  The HCA extended the scope to incorporate more than the rights of the accused 
at trial, to include the rights and privileges of a suspect not charged with an offence, as well 
as the rights and privileges of the person between being charged and commencement of the 
trial.26  Neither the Privilege, nor the Right, is an absolute constitutional guarantee,27 
however, both are statutorily protected in the uniform evidence laws.28  However, a statute 
may exclude the Right, providing it demonstrates a clear intent, although not necessarily 
express words of exclusion.29 
 
20    Ibid 30-1. 
21    Weissensteiner v The Queen(1993) 178 CLR 217 [49]. 
22 Phil Kowalick, 'Silence May Be Golden No Longer', Platypus (online) March 2000  
<http://www.afp.gov.au/media-centre/publications/platypus/previous-editions/2000/march- 
2000/silence.aspx>. 
23   Sorby v Commonwealth [1983] HCA 10 [5], citing Lamb v Munster (1882) 10 QBD 110.  
24   Ibid, citing R v Boyles (1861) 1 B &S 311, 329-30. 
25   Petty v R (1991)102 ALR 129, 154 (Gaudron J). 
26   X7 v Australian Crime Commission (2013) 298 ALR 570, [105] (Hayne and Bell JJ). 
27   Sorby v Commonwealth [1983] HCA 10 [16], citing the Australian Constitution. 
28   See, eg, Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), ss89, 128. 
29  Sorby v Commonwealth [1983) HCA 10 [5], citing R v Associated Northern Collieries (1910) 11 CLR 738, 
748. 
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IV THE RIGHT IN CONTEMPORARY NSW 
A Common Law Prior to UEA 
 The Right of the accused to testify in his/her own defence is a comparatively modern 
development.30  Prior to the introduction of uniform evidence laws, the judge and counsel 
were statutorily prohibited from commenting on the failure of the accused to give evidence.31  
While the law is clear on the burden of proof at trial, the following common law cases 
demonstrate, unequivocally, just how unsettled the law is in clarifying the scope of the Right 
and the associated ability to draw adverse inferences from the defendant's refusal to give 
evidence. 
1 Bridge v The Queen32 
In 1964, the HCA reasserted the statutory position, finding an accused is never required to 
prove their innocence and silence can never shift the burden of proof to the accused.   
Further, it verified silence does not of itself prove anything or corroborate evidence.  In 
contrast, the Court also established the failure of the accused to contradict under oath such 
evidence within the defendant's knowledge to be true or untrue, likely increased the 
probability of the evidence being true.33 
2 Petty v The Queen34 
In 1991, the HCA reaffirmed the prosecution's onus of proof as a vital component of the 
Right, that exists as a fundamental element of the criminal justice system, both during pre-
trial and criminal proceedings.35  The Court also found that a consciousness of guilt cannot be 
drawn from the mere silence of the accused  or that silence at trial is even questionable 
because the accused failed to mention a fact.36 
 
30   Weissensteiner v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 217, 232 (Brennan and Toohey JJ) quoting James Fitzjames  
Stephen A History of the Criminal Law of England (1883) vol 1, 441. 
31    NSW Crimes Act 1900 s407(2). 
32    Bridge v The Queen (1964) 118 CLR 600. 
33    Ibid 615 (Windeyer J). 
34    Petty v The Queen (1991) 173 CLR 95. 
35    Ibid 128-9 (Gaudron J). 
36    Ibid 129 (Gaudron J).  
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3 Weissensteiner v The Queen37 
Prior to the UEA, this 1993 case established authority on the consequences of exercising the 
Right and the scope of judicial comment.  The accused, in this case, exercised his Right in a 
murder charge and the trial judge informed the jury they could safely draw an inference of 
guilt  from the defendant's silence, on facts within his knowledge.   
Weissensteiner v The Queen ('Weissensteiner') narrowed the Petty v The Queen ('Petty') 
findings,  highlighting a distinction between drawing an adverse inference from the accused's 
silence and from silence pertaining to a fact the jury perceives to be within the knowledge of 
the accused.  In so doing, the HCA  upheld Bridge v The Queen ('Bridge'), reaffirming the 
defendant's failure to give evidence is not, of itself, evidence and is not an admission by 
conduct. 
Although the Right was not altogether denied in Weissensteiner, the Court established 
exceptions to the governing principles prohibiting adverse inferences drawn by the jury, 
when the Right was exercised by the defendant.  First, the Court determined that adverse 
inferences can be drawn by the jury 'when the failure of the accused to give evidence is a 
circumstance which may bear upon the probative value of the evidence which has been given 
and which the jury is required to consider'.38  The Court recognised there may be genuine 
reasons for such silence, however, silence cannot be used to add weight to the prosecution's 
case,39 which effectively upheld the burden of proof principles.  Secondly, the Court 
established that a defendant's refusal to respond is sufficient for the jury to draw a 
consciousness of guilt,  in circumstances where the suspect does not exercise the Right and 
selectively chooses to respond to questions or allegations.40  Thirdly, the Court clarified the 
approach to be taken on judicial comment by drawing a distinction between a failure to give 
evidence and the exercise of silence.  It confirmed judicial comment on the defendant's 
silence is permitted, even in jurisdictions where such comment on silence is prohibited.  
However, it clarified this by confirming that a judge's comment can never be justified by a 
failure of the accused to give evidence.41  Therefore, in this case, it was held that the trial 
judge's comment to the jury on the defendant's failure to give evidence, added weight to the 
37    Weissensteiner v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 217. 
38   Ibid 229 (Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ). 
39   Ibid. 
40   Ibid 231. 
41   Ibid (Gaudron, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Callinan JJ). 
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prosecution's case.42  In obiter dictum, the Court acknowledged any jury will likely draw an 
adverse inference from silence of the accused, even when prohibited from doing so,  as 
human reason alone will almost always adopt a consciousness of guilt in such 
circumstances.43  This certainly puts the accused at a greater disadvantage, than if the trial 
judge could properly comment, particularly as unchallenged evidence is safer to accept than 
contradicted evidence, and doubts concerning the reliability of a witness may be more easily 
discounted without contradictory evidence.44   
In conclusion, Weissensteiner established that a jury may consider the defendant's failure to 
explain or contradict, as opposed to a failure to give evidence,  and the trial judge is 
prevented from informing them may do so.  Superficially, this settled these elements of the 
law, until two years later, when the uniform evidence laws were implemented in the 
Commonwealth and NSW jurisdictions, that created further confusion.   
B 1995 Uniform Evidence Legislation 
The implementation of the uniform evidence legislation in 1995, attempted to find middle 
ground between Bridge and Weissensteiner.  Section 89 of the NSW Act primarily upheld 
Bridge and Petty, by prohibiting adverse inferences from the defendant's exercise of the 
Right.  However, a subtle difference exists in s20 of the NSW Act, which enables judicial 
comment on the defendant's silence, providing the comment does not infer a consciousness of 
guilt, both during trial and pre- proceedings,45 which is closer to Weissensteiner.   
Noteworthy, a violation of a s20 judicial comment may result in a retrial.46 Although a 
defendant is not a compellable witness ,47 even though he/she is considered a competent 
witness (subject to ss13 and 14),48 judicial comment restraints are extended to the failure of 
the defendant's spouse, de facto partner, parent or child to give evidence.49  However, the 
UEA creates an obligation on the judge to warn the jury if evidence may be unreliable, 
including the rationale behind the warning and the dangers of accepting such evidence and 
the weight attached to it.  There are no specific words to be used in judicial warnings, which 
42   Ibid 229 (Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ. 
43   Ibid 225 (Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ) quoting R v Burdett (1820)  106 ER 873, 898 (Abbott CJ). 
44   Ibid 225 - 227  (Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ). 
45   Evidence Act 1995 (Cth); Evidence Act 1995 (NSW). 
46   See, eg, Azzopardi v The Queen 205 CLR 50. 
47   Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 17. 
48   Ibid s 12. 
49    Ibid s 20(3).  
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is confirmed as problematical in the following cases, where judicial comment and adverse 
inferences became the subject of judicial interpretation.  
V COMMON LAW POST UEA 
The new uniform evidence legislation presented an opportunity for the judiciary to review the 
scope of the Right during trial and pre-trial proceedings. 
A R v OGD50 
This 1997 appeal case was the first to consider a Weissensteiner adverse inference, on the 
accused's failure to give evidence, against the uniform NSW Act.  The HCA  endorsed two of 
the three Weissensteiner principles on judicial comment, namely the jury should be warned  
first that 'the failure of an accused person to give evidence cannot be treated as an admission, 
by conduct, of guilt...otherwise the right to silence would be negated',51 and secondly, that 
'the failure to contradict or explain incriminating evidence, in circumstances where it would 
be reasonable to expect it to be in the power of an accused to do so, may make it easier to 
accept, or draw inferences from, evidence relied upon by the Crown.'52 
The HCA also confirmed of the necessity to warn a jury that there may be genuine unknown 
reasons why silence is exercised, even if the defendant is in a position to contradict or explain 
evidence.53 
Further, the Court found a Jones v Dunkel54 warning, whereby exercise of the Right 'may 
lead rationally to an inference that his evidence would not help his case',55 also applies in 
criminal cases, however, it warned against the high risk of invoking such a warning to juries, 
because there may be a very good reason why the Right was exercised.56  Nevertheless,  R v 
OGD ('OGD') suggested there is a place for such a warning to counsel in a voir dire,57 prior 
50    R v OGD (1997) 45 NSWLR 744. 
51    Ibid 751-2. 
52    Ibid. 
53    Ibid. 
54   Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298. 
55   Ibid 321 (Windeyer J). 
56   R v OGD (1997) 45 NSWLR 744, 753. 
57   Butt, above n 8, 452 - a trial within a trial conducted in the absence of the jury to discuss such matters as the 
admissibility of evidence or the competency of a witness with counsel.  
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to jury warning, so that the judge can better understand whether such a direction be given, 
considering its fairness.58 
B RPS v R59 
This 2000 HCA case also considered judicial comment within the NSW Act, under an alleged 
s20 violation by the trail judge.  The accused denied all allegations against him during police 
questioning, although he exercised his Right at trial.  In directing the jury, the trial judge 
informed the jury the accused was not obliged to testify, however, the judge suggested the 
jury could 'draw a number of inferences from that failure adverse to the accused'.60 
The Court found: 
It will seldom, if ever, be reasonable to conclude that an accused in a criminal trial would be 
expected to give evidence. The most that can be said in criminal matters is that there are some 
cases in which evidence (or an explanation) contradicting an apparently damning inference to 
be drawn from proven facts could come only from the accused. In the absence of such 
evidence or explanation, the jury may more readily draw the conclusion which the 
prosecution seeks.61 
The HCA also took the opportunity to interpret the word 'suggest' in s20 of the NSW Act,62 
which prohibits judicial comment that suggests an inference of guilt.  The Court confirmed it 
should not be given a narrow application that would attract fine distinctions.  Instead, it 
should be treated in its full operation, as a prohibition against judicial comment on the 
accused's failure to give evidence.63  In so doing, the Court adopted and adapted Bataillard v 
The King,64 which is a very early case finding any judicial comment to the jury 'however 
wrapped up', or suggested, contravenes a statutory prohibition.65 
RPS v R ('RPS') upheld the OGD principles on judicial comment and found in favour of the 
accused.  A retrial was ordered on the basis of the trial judge's comment to the jury, 
suggesting the accused failed to give evidence due to a consciousness of guilt, contravened 
s20.   Additionally, McHugh J reiterated that the preference is to comment on the failure to 
58   R v OGD (1997) 45 NSWLR 744, 754. 
59   RPS v R (2000) 199 CLR 620. 
60   Ibid. 
61   Ibid 632-633 [27] (Gaudron A-CJ, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ). 
62   Evidence Act 1995 (NSW). 
63   RPS v R (2000) 199 CLR 620, 630 (Gaudron A-CJ, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ). 
64   Bataillard v The King (1907) 4 CLR 1282. 
65   Ibid 1282, 1291 (Isaac J). 
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give an explanation, instead of the failure to give evidence, as it is reasonable to expect a 
denial or contradiction from the accused.66 
C Azzopardi v The Queen67 
In 2001, Azzopardi also considered judicial comment on the accused's silence and the 
operation of s20.68 In this case, the accused denied all allegations of a serious indictable 
offence during police questioning and refused to give evidence at the trial.  The trial judge 
informed the jury that the accused was not obliged to testify for the prosecution, that his 
failure to give evidence could not be treated as an admission of guilt and his failure to give 
evidence may affect the weight the jury may give to the evidence from the prosecution's 
witnesses.69 
 
The HCA reaffirmed previous findings that 'an accused is presumed innocent until proven 
guilty; guilt must be established beyond reasonable doubt by the Crown presenting legally 
admissible evidence in a lawfully conducted trial; and an accused cannot be compelled to 
give evidence in his or her own case'.70  Additionally, the majority determined the aforesaid 
Weissensteiner judicial comments contravened s20, suggesting 'the accused did not give 
evidence because the accused was, or believed he was, guilty of the offence charge.'71 
Likewise, Callinan J concurred with the RPS interpretation of s20, stating it best to refrain 
from any comment on the topic.72  The Court further emphasised the circumstances requiring 
judicial comment on the defendant's silence are 'rare and exceptional', limited only to 
circumstances requiring an explanation of additional facts only known to the defendant.73    
Finally, Callinan J asserted the Weissensteiner principles on judicial comment, provisioning 
adverse inferences, 'have no application in a jurisdiction in which s 20(2) has been acted'.74 
66   RPS v R (2000) 199 CLR 620, 644.  
67   Azzopardi v The Queen (2001) 205 CLR 50.  
68   Evidence Act 1995 (NSW). 
69   Azzopardi v The Queen (2001) 205 CLR 50. 
70   Ibid 52. 
71   Ibid. 
72   Ibid 119 [195]. 
73   Ibid 51 (Gaudron, Gummow, Kirby Hayne and Callinan JJ). 
74   Ibid 116 [189]. 
10 
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Noteworthy, Azzopardi also endorsed the RPS wide application of the word 'suggest' in s20, 
confirming that, otherwise, 'the opportunity to exculpate become[s] an obligation to self-
incriminate'.75 
Subsequent to Azzopardi, the law remained relatively settled on these elements of the uniform 
legislation.  However, the NSW government created further confusion, with the 
implementation of the controversial amendments in 2013, that tipped the burden of proof 
away from the prosecution and radically challenged the presumption of innocence.  
VI 2013 NSW AMENDMENTS 
NSW uniform evidence laws took a dramatic turn, when Premier O'Farrell  drove reforms to 
the silence provisions through both Houses of Parliament in one week.  These reforms took 
effect on 1 September 201376 and included the amendment of the disclosure provisions under 
the Criminal Procedure Act 1986.77  The Premier stressed the reforms reflected the 1994 UK 
statutory reforms to their silence provisions78 (UK Amendments) and highlighted the need 'to 
allow juries and the judiciary to draw an adverse inference against an alleged criminal who 
refuses to speak to investigating police, but later produces "evidence" at trial in a bid to be 
found not guilty'.79  Supporting the Premier, the Attorney-General declared 'juries are smart 
enough to be able to apply common sense if it's clear someone has been wrongly accused of a 
crime'.80  It is naive and incorrect to rely on the intelligence of a jury to determine whether a 
person has been wrongly accused; the jury must consider the verdict using the whole of the 
evidence adduced during the trial.   Relying on the jury's intelligence, also suggests a dilution 
of the prosecution's statutory onus of proof, which is confirmed in statute81 and at common 
law,82 and the historical concept, stated by Blackstone, that  'All presumptive evidence of 
75   Ibid 71 [56] (Gaudron, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ). 
76    New South Wales Government <http://legislation.nsw.gov.au/maintop/epub>. 
77   Criminal Procedure Act 1986,s146A - enables the court or the jury to draw inferences as appear proper in  
circumstances whereby the accused fails  to comply with the pre-trial disclosure provisions. 
78   Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (UK). 
79   Barry O'Farrell, Premier of New South Wales, ‘Crime Crackdown: “Right to Silence” Law Toughened’' 
(Media Release, Tuesday 14 August) 2012) 1  
<http://www.premier.nsw.gov.au/sites/default/files/CRIME%20CRACKDOWN%20RIGHT%20TO%20SIL
ENCE%20LAW%20TOUGHENED.pdf>. 
80   Ibid.  
81   Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s141. 
82   Petty v R 102 ALR 129, 154 (Gaudron J). 
11 
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felony should be admitted cautiously; for the law holds, that it is better that ten guilty persons 
escape than that one innocent suffer'.83 
Subject to age and capacity limitations,84 the NSW Amendments permit an unfavourable 
inference drawn by the jury from a failure of the of the accused to give evidence, when 
charged with a serious indictable offence.  It is conditional upon the delivery of a special 
caution in the presence of the accused's legal counsel and includes a prohibition against the 
prosecution from using the unfavourable inference as sole evidence to convict.   This 
safeguard will generally only apply to cases built upon of circumstantial evidence.   Further, 
the NSW Amendments establish an obligation on the accused to disclose any matter during 
official questioning, that may be relied upon as a defence at trial, or any matter that the 
suspect could have reasonably been expected to disclose.85  This is a far reaching obligation 
that impacts on the statutory disclosure provisions, all of which is underpinned by adequate 
legal advice. 
VII IMPACT OF 2013 NSW AMENDMENTS 
A Legal Advice 
Unless a special caution is given in the presence of the suspect's legal practitioner, evidence 
drawn from silence cannot be admitted or commented upon at trial.  This recognises the 
impossibility of an accused person to fully comprehend the depth of the legal consequences 
of silence and also provides the necessary balance to ensure the accused is protected from an 
overbearing state, that may potentially result in a false or improperly obtained admission.  
The UK has a similar statutory condition, with one distinction; the UK provides a 24-hour 
government funded duty solicitor service.86  The NSWLRC confirmed this to be 
problematical in NSW, where there is no such funded legal service to support the reforms.  
Effectively, defence has to be revealed during police questioning and those who cannot 
afford, or access legal advice, are greatly disadvantaged because they will not fully 
comprehend the significance and consequences of remaining silent,87 which could result in a 
false or misguided admission, which may not be adduced as admissible evidence.  The 
83   Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book 4, Chapter 27, 358 (emphasis added).  
84   Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), ss13, 89A(5). 
85   Ibid s 89A(1). 
86  Mike Redmayne, 'English Warnings' (2008) 30.3 Cardozo Law Review 1061 citing David Dixon, Common 
Sense, Legal Advice and the Right of Silence, (1999) 1053. 
87   New South Wales Law Reform Commission, The Right to Silence, Report 95 (July 2000) 65. 
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absence of adequate legal advice may threaten the long-term viability of the NSW 
Amendments.  Initially, the government committed to trialling a unique legal telephone 
advice service,88 however, this does not appear to have been implemented.  Suspects must, 
instead, rely on the limited availability of the Legal Aid hotline, which operates only during  
business hours and free access is restricted.89  The NSW Police Association has since spoken 
out against the reforms, deeming them unworkable, because lawyers are either not turning up 
for the special caution or they are giving advice via telephone consultation,90 which is 
contrary to the statute; it implies the lawyer’s physical presence.91  Conversely, the 
mandatory legal advice requirements, provide an opportunity for hardened criminals to evade 
the reforms, by not pursuing legal advice.92 Although the operation of the reforms, against 
the legal advice requirements, are yet to be judicially considered, the HCA previously 
confirmed 'the common law of Australia does not recognize the right of an accused to be 
provided with counsel at public expense',93 which is at odds with the NSW Amendments. 
However, reverting to the UK experience, where legal advice also underpins the UK 
Amendments, the courts are reluctant to establish that legal advice to remain silent prevents 
an adverse inference at trial.  Further, if the defendant argues a reliance on legal advice to 
remain silent, the defendant risks a waiver of legal privilege, resulting in cross-examination 
of the legal practitioner.94  By contrast, if the defendant merely claims to have stayed silent 
on the basis of advice, then privilege is not waived;95 the defendant must hold a genuine 
belief in the legal advice and a genuine intention to rely on it.96   This distinction justifies the 
critical need for adequate legal advice in NSW, prior to police questioning and the disclosure 
of information, if the reforms are to succeed. 
 
 
88   Greg Smith, Attorney-General and Minister for Justice, ‘Call to Support Changes to Right to Silence’ 
(Media Release,  12 September 2012) 
<http://www.justice.nsw.gov.au/Documents/Media%20Releases/2012/120912_changes_right_to_silence.pdf 
89  Legal Aid New South Wales, Help Over the Phone, <http://www/legalaid.nsw.gov.au/get-legal-help/legal-
helpline>. 
90   'Lawyers Circumventing Right to Silence Laws, NSW Police say' ABC News (online), 15 October 2013 
< http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-10-15/lawyers-circumventing-right-to-silence-laws3a-police/5022578>. 
91   Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s89A(2)(c). 
92   David Hamer, 'Right to Silence Reforms in NSW' (2013) 38.2 Alternate Law Journal 129, 1.   
93   Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292 (Mason CJ and McHugh J). 
94   Redmayne, above n 86, citing R v Wishart [2005] EWCA (Crim) 1337. 
95   Ibid, citing R v Condron [1997] 1 Cr App R 185. 
96   R v Hoare [2004] EWCA Crim 784, 1818 citing R v Betts [2001] 2 Cr App R 257 (Kay LJ). 
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B Disclosure 
The early disclosure implications are further complicated if legal advice is absent.   The 
statute includes a mandatory requirement for the accused to consult with legal counsel in 
private, before official questioning can commence, otherwise the reforms are negated. 
The NSW Amendment package revised associated legislation, to enable an adverse inference, 
as appears proper, to be drawn when the accused fails to comply with pre-trial disclosure 
provisions.97  During official questioning, the accused must now disclose those facts to be 
relied upon in defence at trial, or those that could reasonably have been expected to mention 
during questioning,98 even if the matter has not, of itself, been raised during questioning.  
This creates significant benefit for the prosecution, not only as a coercion for the accused to 
answer questions and produce information, but particularly as an obligation to disclose more 
evidence, earlier in the proceedings.  Disclosure implications are further complicated by the 
need to work up a defence much sooner than previously required; it must now occur before 
the trial date is set.99  Arguably, the reforms also create an expectation, that the police will 
fully disclose their case during questioning and, consequently, the police are now questioning 
the beneficial impact of disclosure reforms.100  Of further concern, regarding the viability of 
the reforms, silence may now be used as a 'bargaining chip by suspects and their legal 
advisers, as a means of encouraging full disclosure of the evidence against them'.101 
Regardless of the imposition of  the onerous disclosure obligations, the accused may be 
further prejudiced at trial, by reason of judicial comment, by exercising the Right, either 
during police questioning, disclosure proceedingsor at trial.  The potential for such a 
prejudicial comment to occur is exacerbated by the lack of clarity governing such 
complicated judicial comment. 
C Adverse Inferences and Judicial Comment 
Section 20 of the NSW Act governs judicial comment and Azzopardi outlines the principles 
for judicial warnings to the jury, when the accused fails to give evidence at trial.  In doing so, 
97   Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), S146A. 
98   Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s89A(1)-(9). 
99   Criminal Procedure Amendment (Mandatory Pre-trial Defence Disclosure) Bill 2013 sch 1 item, amending 
Criminal Procedure Act 1986 ss 136 - 143. 
100  Hamer, above n 92. 
101 Redmayne, above n 86, citing David Dixon, Common  Sense, Legal Advice and the Right of Silence, (1999) 
1061. 
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Azzopardi distinguished between judicial 'comment' and 'direction', emphasising the division 
of functions between the judge and jury, in criminal trials: 
it will almost always be desirable for the judge to warn the jury that the accused's silence in 
court is not evidence against the accused, does not constitute an admission by the accused, 
may not be used to fill gaps in the evidence tendered by the prosecution, and may not be used 
as a make-weight in assessing whether the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable 
doubt. It by no means follows, however, that the judge should go on to comment on the way 
in which the jury might use the fact that the accused did not give evidence.102 
Such a comment should not be a direction.  The jury decides the facts and the weight of the 
evidence, while the judge cannot direct the jury in its verdict deliberations.  The judge may 
direct the jury by identifying issues and giving appropriate warnings about the relevant law 
and legal issues, which includes permissible rationale and the extent of care required in 
assessing evidence and the jury must follow such directions.   
By contrast, judicial comment appending significance to the defendant's silence is a comment 
only and should be aligned to the aforesaid Azzopardi principles.  The jury is free to use or 
discard such judicial comment and should be informed of this discretion.  Conversely, if 
judicial comment is not forthcoming on the accused's silence, the jury may infer adverse 
inferences from the silence.103  However, citing RPS and endorsing Weissensteiner, the HCA 
found 'the preferable course is for comment to be made in terms of a failure to offer an 
explanation, rather than a failure to give evidence'.104 
The NSW Act has limited the extent of judicial comment and removed the tension between 
Weissensteiner and RPS, establishing judicial comment 'will never be warranted merely 
because the accused has failed to contradict some aspect of the prosecution case'.105  Quite 
rightly, it does not permit the prosecution to comment on the accused's failure to give 
evidence and so it follows 'If the prosecution is denied the argument, why should the judge be 
permitted to make it?'106 
Whilst these recent decisions help to clarify the extent of judicial comment and direction, it is 
clear that consistency is lacking, and the uncertain nature of an ill-defined Right operating 
102  Azzopardi v The Queen (2001) 205 CLR 50, 70 [51]. 
103  Ibid 69 70 [49]-[52].  
104  Ibid 74 [65]. 
105  Ibid 75 [68]. 
106  Ibid 64 (Gaudron, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ).  
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within the NSW Amendments, merely adds to the confusion, arising from a complicated set 
of judicial instructions.  There are no judicial determinations on the Right, following the 
NSW Amendments, therefore the author will overview the UK experience to contrast the 
overall effects. 
VIII UNITED KINGDOM CONTRAST 
In 2005, Lord Justice Rose expressed a concern that contemporary England's strong 
predilection towards amending its criminal justice laws was having an adverse effect on the 
criminal justice system.107  One such reform is the UK Amendments,108 radically changing 
the law regarding defendant's right to exercise silence during pre-trial questioning and trial 
proceedings.  The amendments enable the jury to draw an adverse inference from the 
defendant's failure to give evidence or rely on a fact in defence that was not mentioned raised 
by the defendant during pre-trial proceedings, or could reasonably have been expected to 
mention when questioned, charged or informed.109   Similar to the NSW Amendments, the 
UK Amendments are conditional upon the opportunity to consult a solicitor prior to being 
questioned, charged or informed and the delivery of a caution, and the inability to convice 
solely on the evidence of an adverse inference taken from silence.110 
Since the UK Amendments, the courts have confirmed that adverse inferences cannot be 
drawn from pre-trial silence, unless the following clear directions are given to the jury, 
otherwise the burden of proof is distorted: 
a. the burden of proof remains with the prosecution; 
b. the defendant retains the right to remain silent; 
c. the jury is satisfied the prosecution established on evidence there was a case to answer; 
d. the only sensible explanation for silence was that the defendant had no answer to the 
case against him/her, which could have withstood cross-examination; 
e. an inference from failure to give evidence does not in itself prove guilt.111 
 
 
107  R v Bradley [2005] EWCA Crim 20 [39] cited by Susan Nash, 'Recent Developments in English Criminal 
Law and  Procedure' (2005) 29 Crim Law Journal 228 228. 
108  Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (UK) ss 34-37. 
109  Ibid s 34. 
110  Ibid s 34(2A). 
111  R v Cowan [1996] QB 374 [A].  
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R v Webber112 is the most recent UK authority on adverse inferences, which also established 
an adverse inference cannot be drawn if the defence is merely 'putting to proof' a specific 
proposition, if the fact is rejected by the witness. Although questions of fact do not become 
evidence until accepted by a witness, it still plants a seed in the mind of the jury that counsel's 
particular version of events is correct, even though it was not accepted as a fact by a witness 
and cannot be adduced as evidence.113 
IX DIFFERENCES BETWEEN UK AND NSW AMENDMENTS 
The fundamental difference between Australia and the UK is the system of government. 
England does not have a written constitution or a bill of rights and sovereignty is vested in 
the parliament, as a unitary system of government, to make the laws for the entire nation.   
Australia, however, is a constitutionally entrenched federation, comprising one Federal 
government and independently governed states, with  legislative power to make laws 
distributed between the Commonwealth and the states.   Therefore, unlike Australia, the UK 
Amendments are binding and enforceable across the entire nation.  
Although the UK and NSW Amendments hold subtle differences, each fundamentally erodes 
the Right, by enabling adverse inferences drawn from a failure to give evidence.  Whether 
they be adverse inferences or unfavourable inferences, each enlivens a coercion to testify, 
that undermines the presumption of innocence and the Privilege.  Predominantly, silence in 
the UK for any offence is treated as suspicious.114 
In order to understand the environment within which the NSW Amendments developed, it is 
important to glean an international perspective on how the Right is protected, particularly to 
identify  any influences that may have led to the reforms.  
X INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
Treaties provide an insight into the extent of protection afforded the Right in international 
law.   A treaty or covenant is a primary source of international law, 115 that it is binding upon 
its member parties, who are obliged to perform their obligations in a 'good faith' capacity.116 
112  R v Webber [2004] UKHL 1. 
113  Ibid [15]. 
114    Redmayne, above n 86, 1050. 
115    Statute of the International Court of Justice 1945 art 38. 
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A Treaties 
1 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ('ICCPR')117 
 
Principally, from an Australian perspective, the ICCPR recognises the inherent dignity, 
equality and inalienable rights, such as freedom from fear and want, as the foundation of 
freedom and justice.  Australia ratified this treaty in 1980, entrenching it obligations into the 
Human Rights Commission Act ('AHRC Act'), by granting power to the Commissioner to 
monitor compliance and inquire into alleged violations, albeit without enforcement.118  The 
United Nations Human Rights Committee ('UNHRC') hears complaints of violations, 
however, it cannot strike down legislation.119  Specifically, article 14(3)(g) protects the 
defendant’s Right in criminal proceedings, by guaranteeing the presumption of innocence and 
not having to confess guilt or testify against himself.120 These rights are not absolute and can 
be temporarily derogated in exceptional circumstances of an officially proclaimed public 
emergency that threatens the life of a nation.121  The ICCPR provisions are aligned to Lord 
Mustill's rationale, that the immunity against testifying operates as immunity against 
providing information, thereby entitling the Right, as an immunity against having to confess 
guilt.   An Australian appeal case to the UNHRC in 2006 determined a violation of the right 
not to confess guilt requires an act of compulsion, such as prejudicial judicial comment,122 
whereas Australia's  HCA appeal from the same matter, extended such a violation to a failure 
to follow fundamental criminal process.123  This contrasts the inconsistency of the judicial 
interpretation of international obligations against domestic law.  However, Australia's 
interpretation is consistent with the USA threshold of a fundamental procedural breach, such 
as police persisting in an interview with an accused after the Right has been exercised.124 
 
116    Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (entered  
into force 27 January 1980) art 26. 
117   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, (entered into 
force 23 March 1976) art 4 [1]-[2]. 
118    Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth), s9, sch 1. 
119    Australian Human Rights Commission, Fact Sheet 5:The international bill of rights (2009) 
<https://www.humanrights.gov.au/sites/default/files/content/education/hr_explained/download/FS5_Intern
ational.pdf>. 
120   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, (entered into 
force 23 March 1976) art 14 [2], [3][g]. 
121   Ibid art 4 [1]-[2]. 
122    Human Rights Committee, Communication No 1154/2003, 88th sess, UN Doc CCPR/C/88/D/1154/2003 (15 
November 2006) 8 [4.13] ('Katsuno v Australia'). 
123    Katsuno v R (199) 166 ALR 149, [35]. 
124   Michigan v Mosley (1975) 423 US 96 (Stewart J). 
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Entrenchment of treaty obligations is problematical, in that they are not automatically enacted 
in the Australian states and territories, by reason of ratification.125  However, the 
constitutional power of the Commonwealth to enter into treaties for the entire nation is a 
controversial argument that was nominally challenged in the renowned Australian case, 
Commonwealth v Tasmania ('Tasmanian Dam Case').126  The HCA found  the 
Commonwealth acts within its external affairs constitutional power,127 to enact treaty 
obligations into domestic law for the whole nation,128 providing the new laws are appropriate 
and adapted to implementing the treaty obligations129 and the treaty is bona fide and not a 
contrivance for enhanced jurisdiction.130  Consequently, the states and territories are likely 
restrained by these ICCPR obligations.  
 
Noteworthy, in a further demonstration of its commitment to the preservation of human 
rights, the Commonwealth government established  the Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Human Rights ('PJCHR'), who holds responsibility for scrutinising Bills and Acts for 
compatibility with international human rights obligations.  However, the PJCHR can only 
produce a statement of compatibility131 and lacks power to enforce protection of the Right. 
B Canada 
Looking to another international Commonwealth nation, the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms ('Charter') protects, inter alia,the right to answer and defence, the right to counsel, 
and the presumption of innocence and provides an immunity against self-incrimination.132 
Noble v R133 is the seminal Canadian case on the Right, where the Supreme Court ('CSC') 
found any Canadian court is precluded from considering the defendant’s failure to give 
evidence, thereby protecting the Right and the presumption of innocence.134  The CSC also 
confirmed the principle of voluntary confessions and the non-compellability of the accused at 
125   Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth), s5. 
126   Commonwealth v Tasmania(1983) 158 CLR 1. 
127   Australian Constitution, s51 (xxix). 
128   Commonwealth v Tasmania 1983) 158 CLR 1 (Murphy J). 
129  Victoria v Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 416 (Brennan CJ, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ). 
130  Andrew Naylor, 'Australia's Treaty Making Process' (1995) 67 Australian Law Reform Commission - Reform 
Journal 3. 
131  Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 (Cth), ss 3-5, 7.  
132  Canada Act 1982 (UK) c 11, sch B pt 1 ('Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms') ss7, 8, 10(b), 11(c)-
(d). 
133  Noble v R [1997] 1 SCR 874. 
134  Ibid. 
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trial as constitutionally guaranteed under s11(c) of the Charter.135   Additionally, R v 
Hebert136 confirmed the Right at trial exists in s7 of the Charter and established that a 
confession is improperly obtained, and therefore inadmissible in evidence, if the Right was 
compromised during pre-trial proceedings.137  Further, statutory restraints prevents a trial 
judge or the prosecution from commenting on the accused's silence.138 Although the 
existence of the Right under the Charter, both before and during trial proceedings, is 'virtually 
inviolable'139 the CSC acknowledged the impossibility of preventing a jury from applying an 
adverse inference to the accused's failure to testify, confirming it to be an error of law.140  
Clearly, the Canadian Right is protected as an absolute guarantee, under the Charter. 
C United States of America 
Looking to the Right in the USA, the Fifth Amendment protects against self-incrimination, 
entitling the Right, also as a constitutional guarantee.  The Fifth Amendment is invoked by 
the accused against giving evidence.141 
In Miranda v Arizona, the Supreme Court ('USSC') endorsed the defendant's right not to 
testify and extended the application of the Fifth Amendment to include pre-trial proceedings.  
It also acknowledged the intimidating environment of official questioning, by establishing 
proper cautioning of the accused,142 before police questioning commences.  Known as the 
Miranda warnings, they include the Right and the right to have an attorney present during 
questioning (a government-appointed attorney if the suspect cannot afford one).143  The Court 
maintained the principle of voluntary confessions, confirming statements made during police 
questioning, without a Miranda warning, are inadmissible, as a violation of the Fifth 
Amendment  privilege against self-incrimination'.144  Once the Right is exercised, police 
interrogation must desist and any further statement taken 'is a product of compulsion' and 
135  Ibid [72] (Sopinka J). 
136   R v Hebert [1990] 2 SCR 151. 
137   Ibid (McLachlan; Dickson CJC, Lamer, La Forest, L'Heureux-Dube, Gonthier and Cory JJ concurring). 
138   Canada Evidence ActSC 1985, s 4(6).. 
139   Elizabeth Stone, 'Calling a Spade a Spade: the Embarrassing Truth about the Right to Silence' (1998) 22 
Criminal Law Journal 19, 17. 
140  Noble v R [1997] 1 SCR 874 (Sopinka J).  
141  United States Constitution amend V. 'No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime...nor shall any person... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be 
deprived of f life, liberty, or property, withou due process of law'; Miranda v Arizona (1966) 384 US 444. 
142  Miranda v Arizona (1996) 384 US 436, 445 (Warren CJ). 
143  < http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fifth_amendment>. 
144  Miranda v Arizona (1996) 384 US 436 (Warren CJ) 
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likely to be excluded from evidence.145  Noteworthy, this 'product of compulsion' is 
consistent with the aforesaid UNHRC findings in the Katsuno v Australia case.146  Finally, 
adverse inferences drawn from silence are absolutely prohibited in the US,147 acknowledging 
there can be a genuine reason, other than guilt, as to why the Right is exercised, and drawing 
an adverse inference offends the Constitution.148  This clearly demonstrates the protection 
afforded the Right in the USA, as a clearly defined absolute constitutional guarantee. 
D New Zealand 
Moving to Australia’s neighbours, the third and fourth of Lord Mustill's immunities, that 
safeguard the Right during official questioning and at trial, are protected in statute in New 
Zealand, by not having to testify or confess guilt.149  The Right is further protected in the 
Evidence Act 2006, with no obligation to answer questions and adverse inferences from the 
defendant's silence, either pre- trial or at trial, are prohibited.150  Similar to Australia, the 
judge may comment on the defendant's silence,151 however, such comment cannot infer 
guilt.152  A seminal NZ Appeal case, Trompert v Police,153 followed Weissensteiner, 
establishing an adverse inference from silence can be drawn when the defendant would be 
expected to have knowledge.  NZ holds a similar statutory position to Australia in protecting 
the Right, meaning it is vulnerable to statutory change, similar to the NSW Amendments. 
XI GENUINE NEED FOR REFORM? 
After exploring the harmful effects of the NSW Amendments to the Right, also confirmed in 
the UK experience, the obvious question must be asked.  Was there a genuine need for the 
NSW Amendments?  Premier O'Farrell embarked upon these changes not long after his 
landslide victory in the 2011 election.  The community is more likely to accept such changes 
to a fundamental human right if it is perceived, on balance, the need is outweighed by the 
community interest in maintaining law and order. 
145  Michigan v Mosley (1975) 423 US 96 (Stewart J). 
146  Human Rights Committee, Communication No 1154/2003, 88th sess, UN Doc CCPR/C/88/D/1154/2003 (15 
November 2006) 8 [4.13] ('Katsuno v Australia'). 
147  Hamer, 'The privilege of silence and the persistent risk of self-incrimination: Part 1', above n 92, 162. 
148  Griffin v California (1965) 380 US 609 (Douglas J). 
149  Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ), ss23(4), 25(d). 
150  Evidence Act 2006 (NZ), s32. 
151  Ibid s 33. 
152  Ibid s 32. 
153  Trompert v  Police [1985] 1 NZLR 357. 
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Accurate empirical research on the impact of such reforms is difficult to obtain, given its 
subjective complex nature and the substantial assumptions potentially made during interview 
of the sample suspects.154  Research conducted by the NSWLRC, surveying judiciary and 
legal professionals, confirmed 'suspects remained silent when questioned by 
police...[however] this did not occur in the majority of cases'.155  Further, the NSWLRC 
reported empirical research conducted by the NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research 
in 1980  concluded only '4% of suspects subsequently charged and tried in Sydney District 
Court remained silent in police interviews'.156  Additionally, the NSWLRC confirmed 
research undertaken by the Victoria Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions ('DPP') in 
1988 and 1989 found that 'suspects did not answer police questions in 7% to 9% of 
prosecutions'.157  Although this research is dated, the NSW Law Society confirmed it was not 
aware of more recent domestic research that proposes a change in law that would achieve the 
NSW Government's desired outcome.158 
Reverting to the UK experience, empirical research was conducted on the impact of the UK 
Amendments between 1995 and 1996, not long after the amendments were enacted, therefore 
not accurately reflecting the current appeal position.  Nevertheless, it did conclude the UK 
Amendments 'did not have a major impact because there was no discernible increase in the 
conviction rate or the rate of guilty pleas'.159  More recent UK research from the UK Crown 
Prosecution Service confirms the conviction rate for contested trials in the Crown Court 
remains stagnant - 57 percent in 1998.  While the conviction rate rose in 2006 to 64 percent, 
it dropped again to 59 percent in 2007, which was moderately due to an increase in the 
number of defendants pleading guilty (guilty pleas may increase the number of acquittals if 
the case is weak).  Alternative UK research confirmed a decline in the conviction rate from 
77 percent in 2000, to 69 percent in 2007, against an increase in guilty pleas.160  Noteworthy, 
the NSW Attorney-General is currently reviewing the position regarding encouragement of 
154  Lynsey Blayden, 'Right to Silence' (Issues Backgrounder Research Paper No 4, NSW Parliamentary 
Research Service, Parliament NSW, 2012) 10 [4.1]. 
155  New South Wales Law Reform Commission, The Right to Silence, Report No 95 (July 2000) 16. 
156  Ibid, quoting N. Stevenson, 'Criminal Cases in the NSW District Court: A Pilot Study' in J Basten, M 
Richardson, C Ronalds and G Zdenkowski (eds), The Criminal Injustice System (Australian Legal Eorkers 
Group (NSW) and Legal Service Bulletin, Sydney, 1982) 108-109, 131-136, 14--141. 
157  Ibid, quoting J Coldrey, 'The Right to Silence Reassessed' (1990) 74 Victorial Bar News 25, 26-7; J 
Coldrey,'The Right to Silence: Should it be curtailed or abolished?' (1991) 20 Anglo-American Law Review 
51, 54-5. 
158   Justin Dowd, 'Right to silence change is bad law', The Australian, 17 August 2012. 
<https://www.lawsociety.com.au/about/news/643979>. 
159     Redmayne, above n 86, 1081, citing Tom Bucke et al, The Right of Silence: The Impact f the Criminal 
Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (Home Office Research Study No 199, 2000) 65. 
160     Redmayne, above n 86, 1082. 
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early guilty pleas, however, this NSWLRC Report is not yet publicly available for 
comment.161 
This vague research suggests little value can be safely applied to the impact of the UK silence 
provisions at trial.162  This conclusion was drawn by the NSWLRC in 2000, when it 
recommended to the Attorney-General that the UK Amendments not be transported to s89 of 
the NSW Act because 'the empirical data...does not support the argument that the right to 
silence is widely exploited by guilty suspects, as distinct from innocent ones, or...that it 
impedes the prosecution or conviction of offenders'.163 There may be very good reason why 
an accused remains silent, either through fear, confusion, illness or protecting a family 
member.  Consequently, silence does not necessarily equate to guilt, and it is, therefore, 
difficult to justify the Premiers' rationale, aside from 'talk[ing] tough on law and order'.164 
However, this focus on uniformity across Australia promoted widespread parliamentary 
reviews on the Right.  
XII REFORM REVIEWS 
Various independent law reform agencies have inquired into the future existence of the Right, 
however, their powers are limited to merely reporting to their respective Parliament.  The 
aforesaid combined 2005 Report  did not recommend changes to the silence provisions.165 
While the 2000 NSWLRC Report recommended the removal of the prohibition of 
prosecution comment in s 20(2),  it stated the remaining law regarding the Right should not 
change.166  Further, the 2002 Northern Territory Law Reform Commission  ('NTLRC') 
Report responded with resounding opposition to any changes based on the UK 
Amendments.167  Moreover, the NSW Parliamentary Legislation Review Committee inquired 
into the Right in 2006, advising the Parliament that the 'overwhelming majority of the 
submissions noted the importance of maintaining the right to silence'.168    
161     New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Encouraging appropriate early guilty pleas, Report No 141 
(2014. 
162     Redmayne, above n 86, citing Crown Prosecution  Service, Annual Report and Accounts Annual Report 
(2007-08); Ministry of Justice, Judicial and Court Statistics (2007), 123-25. 
163     New South Wales Law Reform Commission, above n 14, 65. 
164     Hamer, above n 92. 
165     Australian Law Reform Commission, Uniform Evidence Law, Report No 102 (2005) 29 [10.1]. 
166     New South Wales Law Reform Commission, above n 14, 181 [Recommendations 14 - 15]. 
167     Northern Territory Law Reform Committee, Report on the Right to Silence,  Report No 25 (2002) 5, 20. 
168   Legislation Review Committee, Parliament of New South Wales, The Right to Silence, Responses to the 
Discussion Paper(2006) 10. 
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These reviews demonstrate a strong opposition to further reforms to the laws of silence, 
within the uniform evidence states, following the implementation of the UEA.  This advice 
was subsequently ignored by the NSW Premier in driving the NSW Amendments, which 
posed a distinct threat to harmonisation of laws in Australia. 
XIII THREAT TO UNIFORMITY 
The Council of Australian Governments ('COAG')  is underpinned by numerous Councils, 
with one such Council being the Law Crime and Community Safety Council, that replaced 
the former Standing Committee of Attorneys-General ('SCAG').169  In 1991, SCAG gave in-
principle approval to uniform evidence laws, based on the NSW and Commonwealth Bills.  
Although the respective Uniform Evidence Acts followed in 1995, NSW since amended its 
legislation in 1997 and 2002, thereby diminishing the concept of uniformity.170  NSW later 
supported the SCAG decision to adopt model uniform evidence legislation, based on the 
recommendations of the Australian, Victorian and NSW Law Reform Commissions' 
combined Final Report in 2005.171  The participating states and territories progressively 
followed with their own legislation based on the model bill.   
Importantly, the 2005 Report strongly criticised attempts to introduce non-uniform provisions 
into the uniform evidence Acts, stating 'there is little incentive for jurisdictions to maintain 
uniformity on other existing provisions, and the overarching purpose of the Acts will be 
lost'.172  It also recommended the adoption of a multi-lateral Inter-governmental Agreement 
('IGA'), requiring SCAG approval of amendments, in advance of their implementation.  
Although, an IGA was not created, the official Communiqué confirms there were no 
proposed changes to the silence provisions.  Against this bi-partisan commitment to national 
uniformity, it is difficult to ascertain the rationale behind the NSW Amendments, unless it 
was politically driven.  It borders on an arrogance (or is it a naivety), that effectively 
undermined the concept of uniformity and highlights the urgent need for an IGA, similar to 
the National Partnership Agreement on Legal Assistance Services.173 
 
169    Council of Attorneys-General, <https://www.coag.gov.au>. 
170    Stephen Odgers, 'Uniform Evidence Law' (Lawbook Co, 11th ed, 2014) 2-3. 
171    Law Crime and Community Safety Council, Uniform Evidence Laws, (16 December 2014) NSW 
Government, <http://www.lccsc.gov.au/sclj/archive/former_sclj/projects/uniform_evidence_laws.html>. 
172    Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 165, 698 [20.81]. 
173    Law, Crime and Community Safety Council, Council of Australian Governments, Communique 3 October 
(2014) 1. <http://www.lccsc.gov.au/agdbasev7wr/sclj/lccsc%204%20july%202014%20communique.pdf>. 
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XIV STATUTORY ABROGATION 
A Compulsory Examinations 
The NSW Amendments are but a small sample of the extent of statutory abrogation of the 
Right, which was affirmed by Lord Mustill, providing it includes a clear intent and uses 
unambiguous terms.174  This is settled law in Australia175 and was extended in Pyneboard to 
include non-judicial proceedings,176 such as statutory or administrative examinations.  
Importantly, the HCA clarified the statutory compulsory examination of a person does not 
offend the constitutional right to trial by jury.177  Compulsory examinations exist within 
many areas of executive government throughout Australia, such as non-judicial appeal 
tribunals,178 public administration integrity commissions, such as the Independent 
Commission Against Corruption ('ICAC')  in NSW, and numerous regulatory functions, such 
as taxation laws.  In some tribunals, such as ICAC, information obtained under such 
examinations may be referred to the relevant DPP, with a recommendation that criminal 
charges be considered.   
At times, the need for compelling information obtained under compulsory examinsation can 
be an expected community response.  For example, in NSW, a notifiable accident in an 
underground coal mine triggers a wide-ranging investigation, without adherence to the rules 
of evidence.179  Such examinations include compulsory production of documents and 
responses to questions, purposive to identifying the cause.   However, such evidence cannot 
be later used against the person being questioned in a criminal proceeding, if the person 
objected at the time of questioning or was not warned of the potential for self-
incrimination.180 
Statutory abrogation is demonstrated in the UEA, itself, whereby it abolishes the Right as a 
defence for bodies corporate against providing information in certain jurisdictions.181 
174    Smith v Director of Serious Fraud Office [1992] 3 WLR 66, 30 [F]. 
175    See, eg, Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission  
(2002) 213 CLR 543, [11] citing Potter v Minahan (1908) 7 CLR 277. 
176    Pyneboard Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1983) 152 CLR 328, (Mason ACJ, Wilson and Dawson 
JJ). 
177    Sorby v Commonwealth [1983] HCA 10 [16]. 
178    See, eg, Administrative Appeals Tribunal  conferred under the Administrative Appeals tribunal Act 1975 
(Cth). 
179   Work Health and Safety (Mines) Act 2013, s56. 
180   Ibid s 58. 
181   Uniform Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s187. 
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Some jurisdictions take a hard line in conducting compulsory examinations, particularly 
when a person is not charged with an offence.  For example, the Commonwealth Australian 
Securities and Investment Commission's ('ASIC') statute182 expressly denies a person under 
examination the defence of self-incrimination, if they refuse to give information, sign a 
record or produce a document.183  It has been long recognised by the judiciary that some 
administrative examinations have the potential to prejudice the fair trial of a person 
examined.184 
A balance test is recommended to determine whether the public interest in compelling the 
information outweighs the public interest in protecting the Right.  The Queensland Law 
Reform Commission ('QLRC') confirmed this approach in 2004, recommending the weight of 
the evidence be evaluated by determining whether: 
a. an alternate lawful method of obtaining the evidence is available; 
b. there are procedural safeguards in place to protect against self-incrimination; 
c. the information already exists; 
d. the abrogation is no more than is necessary; and 
e. an immunity exists against the use of compelled information.185 
 
This pragmatic approach to determining whether a compulsory examination ought to be 
implemented in statute is but one example of how the Right can be protected from further 
statutory abrogation. 
 
B Use of Incriminating Evidence from Compulsory Examinations 
The use of incriminating information obtained during compulsory examinations has been 
challenged in the HCA186 and more recently described by French CJ as a 'direct use 
immunity'.187 
 
182  Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth). 
183   Ibid s 68. 
184   X7 v Australian Crime Commission (2013) 298 ALR 570, 589 [53]. 
185   Queensland Law Reform Commission, The Abrogation of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, Report  
No 59 (2004) 55 [6.59]. 
186    See, eg, Hammond v The Commonwealth (1982) 152 CLR 188, 189 (Gibbs CJ, Mason, Murphy, Brennan 
and Deane JJ). 
187   Lee v New South Wales Crime Commission (2013) 302 ALR 363 [2].  
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In X7 v Australian Crime Commission, the HCA considered the conduct of a compulsory 
examination by the Australian Crime Commission ('ACC') and whether the use of evidence, 
obtained under examination of a person charged with a Commonwealth indictable offence 
under the uniform Corporations Act,188could be used to convict the person in subsequent 
criminal proceedings, when the subject matter was the same in both proceedings.189    The 
plaintiff declined to answer the examiner's questions and the  Court ruled the ACC was not 
authorised to require a person charged with a Commonwealth indictable offence to answer 
questions about the subject matter of the charged offence during regulatory examinations, 
effectively upholding the Right when statutorily abrogated.  This finding also limited the 
power of the ACC, confirming its function did not extend to exercising the Commonwealth's 
judicial power, which is constitutionally entrenched.190 
Although the common law has restrained the use of incriminating information obtained 
during compulsory examinations, it is doubtful the systemic practice of compulsory 
examinations, that curtail the Right, will diminish, largely because of the powers conferred by 
Parliamentary sovereignty.  However, only a clear and concise statutory abrogation will be 
respectfully interpreted by the judiciary.191   
Of significant relevance to the question of the extent of statutory abrogation is the recent 
information obtained from a limited 12-month snapshot of independent research that 
confirmed 14 Commonwealth statutory provisions before the Parliament offended the 
Right.192 
XV 'FREEDOMS INQUIRY'193 
The emerging Commonwealth 'Freedoms Inquiry' ('Inquiry'), is underway by the ALRC to 
consider whether, inter alia, Commonwealth legislation encroaches on the Right and whether 
such encroachments are justified.  The ALRC is not due to report back to the Parliament until 
December 2015, therefore, it is impossible to extrapolate any meaningful outcome, until at 
least the submissions are disseminated later in the year.  Nevertheless, given the common law 
endorsement of statutory encroachment of the Right, the Inquiry is unlikely to radically 
188   Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). 
189   X7 v Australian Crime Commission (2013) 298 ALR 570, 612-614. 
190   Australian Constitution ch III. 
191   Lee v New South Wales Crime Commission (2013) 302 ALR 363 [3] (French CJ). 
192   Simon Breheny and Morgan Begg, 'The state of fundamental legal rights in Australia: An audit of federal 
law' (Research Paper, Institute of Public Affairs, December 2014) 2. 
193    Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 9. 
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change this approach.  Encroachments that are 'reasonable, necessary and proportionate' will 
likely be justifiable, while those that simplify the prosecution task of proving a case are likely 
to be considered unjustifiable, due to their limitation on the presumption of innocence and the 
creation of a reverse burden of proof, on the accused.194  At this stage, the Inquiry holds no 
real significance for the examination of the NSW Amendments, except to demonstrate the 
widespread existence of statutory abrogation of the Right and the need for the Inquiry to 
uphold its legal status.  Correspondingly, if the Inquiry confirms the legitimacy of the Right, 
it could provide the ideal opportunity for the Commonwealth to bring pressure to bear on 
NSW, via COAG, to repeal its reforms to the uniform evidence laws. 
XVI CONCLUSION 
The Right is not a clearly defined legal principle and parliaments and courts have grappled 
with this issue, circumventing and reinventing it over a protracted period.  Its intrinsic nature 
in criminal proceedings affords protection to the accused against abuses of state power, that 
potentially result in confessions achieved under threat of pain or punishment, and asserts a 
freedom to choose whether to speak or testify and the right to be treated fairly and without 
prejudice.  It is not constitutionally protected in Australia and, therefore, holds no absolute 
guarantee.   
From 1995, the Right was statutorily protected in most Australian jurisdictions in criminal 
proceedings, under the uniform evidence law, which resulted in greater certainty.  However, 
the 2013 NSW Amendments have eroded the Right, by permitting unfavourable inferences, 
drawn from the accused's failure to give evidence, in an environment where the HCA 
confirmed such inferences a distinct erosion, that diminishes its value.  Although not required 
to testify at trial , the NSW Amendments create an entrapment for the accused, who is now 
exposed to pain or punishment, either by speaking or remaining silent;  this is a direct 
contrast to Lord Mustill's immunities, that are applied in Australia's common law.   
Consequently, maintaining silence will likely generate inculpatory evidence, because an 
unfavourable inference is now permitted.  Moreover, the NSW Amendments are merely 
'dressing up' a threat or coercion for the accused to testify and will almost certainly 
unknowingly harm a defence, with or without legal advice, and this specifically undermines 
the presumption of innocence, the Privilege and the Right.  There is nothing preventing the 
194  Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, Parliament of Australia, Guidance Note 2: Offence 
provisions, civil penalties and human rights (2014) 2. 
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jury from being unduly influenced by the defendant's exercise of the Right, thereby 
weakening the potential for an innocent verdict.  It must always be remembered that an 
unfavourable inference drawn from the defendant's failure to give evidence does not prove 
guilt. 
The true value of the judicial restraint against an inference of guilt is questionable.  The 
reforms create a significant burden on the trial judge to ensure the jury is given clear and 
concise directions, without inferring or suggesting a consciousness of guilt; such a violation 
may result in a miscarriage of justice.  As a consequence, judicial comment has become 
onerous and complex, and no matter how diluted,  the comments will be prejudicially 
interpreted by the jury, when weighing the probative value of the evidence against the 
accused.  In practice, once the matter is raised, by human reason alone, the jury cannot shut 
their mind to an unfavourable inference drawn from the defendant's failure to give evidence, 
regardless of how it is presented and merely because it is prohibited.   It does not follow that 
a failure to speak constitutes evidence of fact against the accused; there may be a genuine 
reason for the defendant's silence. 
Although the NSW Amendments are yet to be judicially considered, the UK experience 
demonstrates the Right is no longer a right to remain silent.  Unfavourable inferences 
undermine the presumption of innocence and create a reverse burden of proof , which the UK 
courts have confirmed - the prosecution's case should stand independently of unfavourable 
inferences.  Domestic and UK research make it difficult to justify the NSW Amendments, 
with no reliable evidence confirming a reduction in conviction rates to weigh against the 
erosion of the Right - the balance has been tipped away from the accused for political 
expediency.      
The Right in NSW is no longer akin to ICCPR obligations, which recognises the Right as a 
foundation of freedom and justice.  Unfavourable inferences and the high risk of misguided 
prejudicial judicial comment on the defendant's silence will increase the risk of an ICCPR 
violation.  However, the ICCPR does not provide absolute protection to the Right and 
presents an unlikely avenue of appeal for most, particularly given the uncertain outcome and 
cost constraints.  Constitutional protection of the Right removes the uncertainty and 
facilitates a clear and consistent judicial interpretation of statutes.   In countries where the 
Right is not constitutionally protection, such as New Zealand, the precarious nature of the 
Right leaves it vulnerable to further statutory erosion, to the extent demonstrated within the 
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UK and NSW Amendments.  Similarly, the remaining Australian states and territories  are 
vulnerable to the UK influences, although the majority have resisted so far.   
Statutory abrogation should be no more than is absolutely necessary to achieve a specific 
objective.  If the Right is to co-exist with compulsory examinations, the 'direct use immunity' 
must be strictly applied, if consequential criminal proceedings occur.  Further, the statutory 
abrogation balance test, proposed by the QLRC in 2004, must be implemented to realign the 
focus of the executive governments, if the common law Right is to be protected.  While the 
Freedoms Inquiry is the ideal mechanism to reign in unjustifiable statutory abrogation, it will 
not likely achieve that outcome, largely due to the Commonwealth's significant investment 
in, and normalisation of, compulsory examinations.  The singular focus of the Inquiry does 
not extend it tentacles beyond Commonwealth statutes,  therefore eliminating an opportunity 
to repeal the NSW Amendments, unless the opportunity can be used to assert influence via 
COAG.  Decades of COAG effort went into harmonising the evidence law and, although 
promoting the ideology of harmonisation, NSW effectively severed the code of uniformity by 
implementing the 2013 reforms.  This is not the first time NSW has legislated outside of a 
COAG agreement; the COAG obligations should be honoured and the reforms repealed.  For 
its part, COAG must give clarity to jurisdictional implementation constraints, by way of an 
IGA, to identify essential provisions that cannot be changed, without consensus.  In the 
absence of such constraints, states will continue to legislate their own amendments because, 
notwithstanding Constitutional express powers, the Commonwealth cannot enforce 
legislation upon the states.  Ideally, genuine uniformity, such as the Corporations Act 2001, 
can only be achieved if the states abrogate their powers to the Commonwealth for a particular 
purpose, however, this enlivens the contentious debate on the decline in state sovereignty - a 
topic for another paper. 
Regardless of how they are dressed up, the NSW Amendments are an erosion of a long-
standing common law human right.  Although the spotlight is on human rights in Australia, 
the Human Rights Commissioner has a considerable task in overseeing compliance with 
international obligations, albeit unenforceable.  There is a strong need for vigilence and 
assertive influence by the Commissioner to retain the common law status of the human Right, 
for all vulnerable people, that is aligned to international standards - the 'one size fits all' NSW 
model will not achieve that objective. 
Conversely, if the NSW Amendments are not repealed, modifications are at least required to 
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make them workable.  The special caution requires clarity to clearly and succinctly explain 
the deleterious effect of silence and the likely harm to a defence from unfavourable 
inferences drawn from such silence.  The words currently used do not extend this far, 
particularly for vulnerable people - everyone is vulnerable once they enter the criminal justice 
system.  
Finally, contrasting the UK Amendments highlights a fundamental flaw in the operation of 
the NSW Amendments.  Correspondingly, the NSW Amendments are conditional upon the 
accused having access to a legal practioner,  who must be in attendance during the delivery of 
the special caution, otherwise, the reforms in s89A cannot be applied.  In the UK, the 
government provides a free 24-hour legal service, whereas in NSW, access to a free legal 
services is restricted and only operates during business hours.  The ramifications are such that 
a court could strike down the NSW Amendments, if the legal advice provisions are not met 
and the special caution is delivered regardless.   Principally, official questioning during pre-
trial proceedings must cease, if a legal practitioner is not present to witness the special 
caution,  thereby negating the original intent of an over-zealous Parliament. 
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